This week, I am putting up the longest entry (by far) included on this blog. It is a letter sent by the colleague I mentioned in my penultimate post: an esteemed teacher and reputable union rep who also suffered victimisation under the head at our previous school, and consequent unfair treatment from the governing body and council.
It is so rigorously and powerfully written that I could not make cuts to it. I have anonymised it. I urge you to read the whole letter to get the full picture.
The collusion and dishonesty unveiled is staggering. Why has
nothing ever been done to rectify this mess? All involved (the chair of
governors, the DPO, the head, certain members of the council) come out of it
looking like vicious, petty-minded amateurs – intent on covering up a lack of
general decency.
________________________
15th June, 2022
Dear [Director of Law,
Governance and Elections],
Re: confidential whistleblowing
concern
In your capacity as [the]
Council’s Director of Law, Governance and Elections, and in accordance with [the]
Council’s whistleblowing policy, I am writing to you to raise a whistleblowing
concern about the Council. The policy advises whistle-blowers to write to the
Head of Law. I assume that your role has subsumed that of Head of Law. Please
do correct me if I am wrong to assume this so that I can contact the correct
person.
I was employed at [the] Primary
School from 2013 to 2021. As a teacher in a maintained [council] school, I was
on the payroll of [the] Council. Unfortunately, I have reason to believe that I
have been subjected to victimisation by [the] Council managers. I am therefore raising
this complaint as a whistle-blower, confidentially though not anonymously.
Despite working in a different local authority now, it remains possible that
attempts could be made to victimise me further for raising this concern. I therefore
expect protection from victimisation to be extended to me in accordance with
the law. I understand that a precedent has been set to extend protections to
individuals who make a protected disclosure in relation to a former employer.
Victimisation is one of the
concerns I wish to raise with you. My overall concern is not a personal employment
issue however, but rather a public interest one.
While I understand that I am
not expected to prove my allegations, I have provided some information to support
them. I believe that I have exhausted alternative attempts to address the
concerns, culminating in correspondence with my local [council] ward councillor
and the Cabinet Member for Children’s Services and School Performance, who advised
me that it may be possible to raise this whistleblowing complaint. I have omitted
the names of those concerned but will be happy to provide them to an appropriate
person who conducts any potential investigation.
It is my reasonably held
belief that [the] Council managers have committed the following acts, which I
list below in connection with three of the qualifying areas set out in the
Council’s whistleblowing policy:
1.
A health and safety risk to employees:
a. Failure
to investigate reasonable concerns about the work-related deterioration of the
mental health of employees.
b. Failure
in a duty of care towards employees’ good mental health.
c. Breach
of local authority and national Covid-19 guidance.
2.
Conduct that is a criminal offence or a
breach of law:
a. Breach
of General Data Protection Regulation.
b. Misrepresentation
and/or negligent misstatement.
3.
Other unethical conduct
(all
of 1 and 2, plus the following):
a. Rule
breaking in the workplace.
b. Dishonesty
in the workplace.
c. Failure
to conduct investigations appropriately.
d. Failure
to respond to reasonable concerns.
e. Undeclared
conflict of interests.
f. Closing
of ranks and/or collusion intended to avoid accountability.
g. Victimisation
following whistleblowing.
I will set out how the School
mishandled both a health and safety concern, which should have been treated as a
protected disclosure, and a disciplinary case following from it; and how, rather
than providing oversight of the School, [the] Council managers closed ranks
with it, constituting a failure of accountability and a perpetuation of my victimisation.
I make my submission both as
a former employee of the Council and as a current, council-tax paying resident
and parent living in the borough. It is my understanding that the managers
concerned have remained in their posts unsanctioned. I am therefore concerned
that the significant errors could be repeated in future by the same individuals,
and that such errors will continue to be made without a change of culture.
Below, I will detail what
happened in chronological order, referring to the areas of concern itemised
above in brackets (for example, [1a]).
___________
Chronology
September 2019
During a staff briefing, the
School’s new chair of governors introduced herself to teaching staff, inviting staff
to make contact with her to share suggestions on how to improve the School. No
contact email address was provided.
November 2019
On 13th November,
I emailed the school’s chair of governors to inform her that I wished to convey
a letter to her from members of staff. I wrote: ‘The reason I am writing to you
is that several – probably a majority – of teaching staff wish to communicate a
concern to you about the recent conduct of the Head Teacher via a
collectively-written letter.’ The chair of governors responded and enquired about
the nature of the letter (this exchange was included, incompletely, in my
subsequent disciplinary hearing pack). I informed her that the collectively signed
letter would express concerns about staff wellbeing and mental health. The idea
of a letter was triggered by the nervous breakdown of a colleague in the school
following interactions between him and the headteacher. I had reason to believe
that the breakdown was caused by those interactions, since I had been informed
by the colleague that the headteacher had acknowledged his deteriorated mental
health, offering him time off work, shortly before making highly unreasonable
demands of him that triggered the incident. This followed a longer pattern of
what he considered to be harassment in the workplace. I understand that the
colleague required assistance to leave the building. He informed me that he was
able to corroborate his information and I had no reason to doubt him having
built up a relationship of professional trust over several years. I therefore
had reason to believe that the headteacher had acted recklessly with respect to
the wellbeing of a member of staff. We did not want this incident to be
repeated.
Around the time that I
co-drafted the letter, the headteacher invited me to her office to encourage me
to accept a prolonged secondment in another school. Only when I asked about the
details did she reveal that the school in question was her previous school […].
Her reasoning was not coherent. I would be supporting a struggling member of
staff, she said; however, secondments should provide an opportunity for the
person being seconded to gain new skills, not vice versa. I declined her offer,
saying I was committed to my current class, and this was followed by more
pressure on me to agree, by email. In retrospect, it is likely that the
headteacher had been tipped-off about the proposed whistleblowing letter; the
meeting constituted an attempt to physically remove me from the School so that I
could not circulate the letter – and, moreover, so I could be monitored by the
headteacher’s former (or, as we shall see, current) colleagues at [her previous school] It
is important to note that no such secondment programme existed at [the school];
this was exceptional. [3g, 3b].
It much later came to my
attention that the headteacher appears to have served as an associate member of
[her previous school’s] governing body until as late as July 2021, over two
years into her headship of [the school], and that she did not declare this.
While I understand that a person may serve on the governing bodies of two
different schools, statutory guidance requires this be declared in a register
of interests and published on each of the school’s websites. These interests
include ‘governance roles in other educational institutions’. An associate
member of a governing body is a governance role. I understand that the
headteacher did not declare her associate membership of the […] governing body
in the [...] governing body’s register of interests.
In line with the guidance, a
commitment to declaring interests was published by [the school]. The
headteacher will therefore have breached the [...] governors’ code of conduct
in failing to make this declaration, bringing the governing body into disrepute.
I note that, in this instance, ‘the governing body should consider suspending
the governor’ (paragraph 34). [3e]
While the letter was being
discussed and drafted, it was suggested by colleagues that I enquire with the
chair of governors about whether our names could be kept confidential from the
headteacher to avoid possible victimisation (at this point, several staff had
already committed to sign, however). I agreed and put this suggestion to the
chair of governors in the initial email to her. She ultimately agreed to the
confidentiality we asked for. She also asked to see the proposed letter
electronically, which existed as a final draft. I agreed to this; she received
and read the letter.
I reiterated my offer to
have the letter signed. The chair of governors replied to me on 17th
November that signatories to the letter were not necessary. This email was unfortunately
not included in the email trail in my hearing pack. I have however retained my
copy of it. Nevertheless, even the email trail included in my hearing shows
that the chair of governors did not respond to my offer for the letter to be
signed.
The chair of governors
agreed to speak to the headteacher about the concerns raised in the letter. I
therefore quite reasonably took her declining of my offer to have the letter
signed to mean that she had accepted the letter in good faith on behalf of
colleagues, and that she took the matter seriously. I would therefore be
extremely surprised to hear, in my subsequent disciplinary hearing, School
management now doubting that the letter had in fact come from more than one
member of staff. If the chair of governors had any doubts about this then she
should have told me as much and accepted my offer to have the final draft signed.
School management acted disingenuously and dishonestly here; the chair of
governors in effect sabotaged a whistleblowing attempt made to her by giving
the false impression that she had accepted the letter on behalf of staff, when
she had not, thus preventing me from collecting the signatures formally. She
also broke her guarantee of confidentiality, which further sabotaged the
attempted confidential complaint. The subsequent disciplinary case against me had
the (no doubt intended) effect of making it very difficult for me or colleagues
to submit the letter again as signed, since I and others already inferred that
I had been singled out for victimisation having raised the concern.
In our correspondence, the
chair of governors asked me if the letter was a grievance or whistleblowing
submission. I shall return to the question of a grievance below.
While I did not use the term
‘whistleblowing’ at the time, it is clear to me, having undertaken research,
that the letter did constitute a protected disclosure. I will explain why this
is the case below. The intended recipient mishandled the protected disclosure.
The only whistleblowing
policy published in the [...] staff hand-book related to the safeguarding of
children, not to any conduct aside from this area. Hence my response: ‘I looked
at the WB policy and I’m really not sure that would apply’. There should have
been a whistleblowing policy aside from a solely safeguarding whistleblowing
policy. The chair of governors was in a position of responsibility to advise me
on this. She should have shared with me the most up to date policy if there was
one. She did not.
I had received no training
on whistleblowing and was acting as a stand-in union workplace representative (one
of the reps was the individual who had the breakdown and the other rep had
resigned her position). It was incumbent upon the chair of governors to proactively
explore the likelihood that my letter constituted a protected disclosure, which
I believe it did. After all, I had confidentially raised a health and safety
concern with a superior of the headteacher about the conduct of the headteacher.
These facts were clearly consistent with the definition of a protected
disclosure. What is more, she received and read the letter. In not properly
considering that I had raised a whistleblowing concern about the conduct of the
headteacher, the chair of governors mishandled the concern. In breaking her
assurance of confidentiality, she sabotaged the possibility of whistleblowing
and subjected me to victimisation following the protected disclosure that I had
in fact made.
You will know that, by law,
employers have a general duty of care to ensure the health, safety and welfare
of all their employees, and this includes employees' mental health. The chair
of governors should have known that mental health was a health and safety
matter. She should also have known that a health and safety concern is in the
public interest where a protected disclosure is concerned. [The Council]
Schools HR, who were apparently advising the chair of governors, should also
have known these facts.
The Government states that, ‘You’re
a whistleblower if you’re a worker and you report certain types of wrongdoing’
and ‘You can raise your concern at any time about an incident that happened in
the past’. Crucially, ‘You can still report your concern to them if they do not
have a policy’. It was not incumbent upon me to follow a whistleblowing policy
in order to make a disclosure since no such policy existed.
The fact that I was
whistleblowing was also apparent in my subsequent disciplinary hearing. I was
asked by the [council] HR representative why I didn’t feel I could speak to the
headteacher before going to the Chair. She proposed that going to the chair of
governors would ‘up the ante’. My reply was that we wanted to up the ante. From
this, it was clear to [the] HR and School management that we had escalated a confidential
complaint about the headteacher; that we did not feel safe in complaining to
the headteacher herself. The matter concerned health and safety and was thereby
in the public interest. I had nothing personally to gain. I contend that the
definition of a protected disclosure was met. [1a, 3g, 3b,3f]
To be clear: in the staff
handbook, the possibility of whistleblowing to the chair of governors about the
headteacher’s conduct only appeared in a section about safe conduct.
This was immediately followed by a reminder to staff about reading a safeguarding
and child protection policy. Hence, this context made it abundantly clear that
the whistleblowing in question related to child safeguarding and protection
alone.
This was also the only
section in which, I discovered, the chair of governors’ work email was
published. Therefore, in order to contact the chair of governors confidentially
about a non-safeguarding concern that was in the public interest, one would need
to to have found it under the child safeguarding section, which is not
acceptable. The email address was not published elsewhere in the hand-book, nor
on the School’s website. I was subsequently informed by the School that I could
have found the chair of governors’ School email address via a search within the
email system. However, I was never given training on how to do this prior to my
hearing.
The chair of governors also
asked me if I was submitting a grievance. I said not because it was my
understanding that the alleged victim would need to submit the grievance – though
he was in no position to do so.
During my disciplinary
hearing, the School claimed that there was a complaints procedure that I could
have followed. The hearing was delayed to include this last-minute evidence;
the School wished to contest my claim that there was no confidential complaints
procedure. I stated this because, as I have explained, there was not a
confidential complaints procedure (whistleblowing) in the staff hand-book,
where it would be expected to be found; neither was there any reference to
where such a complaints procedure would be found. I contend that I did look on
the School website in November 2019 and could not find a confidential
whistleblowing policy. I would of course welcome any forensic attempt to
establish this point in fact. Ultimately, my letter should have been handled as
a protected disclosure by the chair of governors and [the council’s] HR. I note
that the question of the whistleblowing policy was not mentioned at all by the
School in my hearing.
My letter asked for action
in view of the recent incident. The chair of governors agreed to speak to the
headteacher and subsequently confirmed that she had done so. While I accepted
this at the time, believing her assurances that she would indeed take the
matter seriously, the fact that I was subsequently investigated while the
incident was not further demonstrates that she had no intention of
investigating the allegations. [The council’s] HR did not take the original
matter seriously either and failed to provide oversight. The incident cannot
have been investigated because the colleague who suffered the breakdown was
never consulted about the incident. I assume that [...] HR advised that no
investigation was necessary; I am concerned that HR managers advised that no
protected disclosure had been made, when it had.
I also understand that the
colleague was not able to pursue a grievance within the usual three-month
period due to his poor state of health (he had been signed off work with
work-related stress, as defined by an occupational health therapist). The chair
of governors has more recently declined to confirm that the incident will be
investigated.
School management and [...]
HR closed-down the possibility of an investigation. It is my reasonably held
belief, given subsequent events, that this was intended to avoid
accountability. [1a, 3g]
To contact the chair of
governors, I used her personal email address, having accessed it on the school
database for parents and carers – the chair of governors was also a parent at
the school. As stated, I was not immediately aware of a more suitable means of
confidential contact, though I acknowledge that I should have made a greater
effort to research this. I admitted this in the disciplinary hearing while also
stating that I did not believe my actions to constitute a GDPR breach at the
time. Following the alleged complaint, I reflected and realised that I may have
put the School at a possible risk of breaching GDPR, even though we now know
that the ICO had no intention of investigating or prosecuting any such suspected
breach, which the School would falsely claim. [The Council’s] Schools HR
supports this false claim as far as I understand.
I made the point at the
time, and I make the same point now, that I considered the matter urgent
because we felt that the headteacher had acted recklessly in relation to a
health and safety matter and could do so again. Whether or not this did happen
again (I know that other former colleagues were subsequently signed off work
with stress) does not change the fact that I had good reason to believe at the
time that the headteacher had acted recklessly. Health and safety took priority
in my mind.
I wrongly believed that,
given the seriousness of the matter, the chair of governors would
retrospectively consent to my use of her personal email address; I was clearly
wrong to think that consent can be given retrospectively. However, the chair
did not complain to me in our correspondence about my use of her email address.
While she switched to her work email address, she continued to reply to my
personal email address; she did not instruct me to write to her again using my
work email address. GDPR was never mentioned. The question of our manner of
contact only came up in the context of confidentiality, not data protection.
The chair of governors twice
guaranteed to keep my identity, as one of the signatories, confidential - promises that she broke soon after. On 29th November (9 days after our
most recent contact) she wrote to the headteacher to ‘make’ her ‘aware’ that
she had been contacted by me. [1a, 3g, 3b]
In my subsequent outcome of
hearing letter, the School would claim that the chair of governors was
concerned about my use of her personal email address, despite my claim that I
was unaware of this concern from our correspondence: ‘You maintain that the
Chair did not make a complaint regarding the use of her personal email,
however, she clearly did raise it as a concern for her.’ And yet, the email to
the headteacher did not show that ‘she clearly did raise it as a concern’. Rather,
the chair of governors used the words ‘make aware’, not concern or complain. The
email did not even mention a distinction between a work email and personal
email address.
It is therefore significant
that my invitation to the fact-finding meeting, which was written by and handed
to me by the headteacher herself, states, ‘I am writing following information I
received from a parent at [the] Primary School. An allegation regarding a
breach of GDPR has been made against you.’ The aforementioned email from the
chair of governors to the headteacher included in the School hearing pack in no
way alleges a breach of GDPR against me, which is not even mentioned. I also
note the headteacher’s use of the passive voice – no parent has in fact
complained.
During the fact-finding
meeting, I attempted to pass on an apology to the chair of governors for any
distress caused, assuming at that point that she had indeed complained, only to
be told by the investigating officer that no apology was necessary because she
had not in fact complained and had not suffered any distress. This was not
included in the minutes but was heard by all present. I noted this in my
hearing statement, and it was not contested by the investigating officer who had
made the remarks. The ICO’s data complaints procedure assumes that the
complainant is the alleged victim.
No evidence was produced in my
hearing to corroborate a complaint having been made by anyone other than the
School’s DPO. If the disciplinary panel, which consisted of governors, was
privy to other evidence that may have corroborated the allegation of a
complaint having been made by the chair of governors then this should have been
included in the hearing pack in the interests of due process – no such evidence
appeared in the hearing pack. [3g, 3b]
The publicly available code
of conduct for serving [...] governors states, ‘We will ensure that our
relationship with the school is conducted in a proper and ethical manner to
avoid compromising our standing as a governor.’ Clearly, dishonesty is not
ethical conduct; neither is failing to investigate a reasonable health and safety
concern and being complicit in the victimisation of an employee having raising
a health and safety concern. [1a, 3b] The chair of governors acted dishonestly in breaking her guarantee of
confidentiality with me (when informing the headteacher that I had contacted
her); the headteacher and other School managers acted dishonestly when claiming
that the chair had complained, when there is no evidence to suggest that she
did.
I realise that individuals
do not receive a salary from [the] Council for serving as a governor. However,
given their important, management role in the running of a maintained school, I
would expect the Council to look at this conduct and take the necessary action.
I also note that the chair of governors’ errors took place following interactions
with the headteacher and [...] HR employees, who are managers on the payroll of
[the] Council.
The School’s hearing pack
also showed how its DPO was involved at this time. In reference to a reply from
the ICO, the DPO informed the headteacher that he had ‘proof’ that the School
had made a report to the ICO about me. The ICO email did show that the School
reported a suspected breach but in no way shows that the ICO intended to open
an investigation, let alone prosecute anyone – as the DPO would later claim in
my hearing. As we shall see, it would subsequently transpire that the ICO held
no record of any correspondence with the School because the ‘matter may not
have met the threshold for reporting’. Hence, the ICO did not retain the 29th
November ‘reporting’ email. The matter cannot have progressed sufficiently for
it to have created a case file and retain records. The School and [...] Council
told, and continue to tell, a very different story.
December 2019
As stated, the headteacher
invited me to a disciplinary fact-finding meeting. In signing this letter of
invitation, she appointed herself to the position of investigating officer in a
disciplinary case. Indeed, the subsequent hearing evidence shows that the
headteacher had already conducted investigations into me, despite the clear
conflict of interests given her role in the original whistleblowing letter
about her. I will explain below how this contravened [the council’s] Schools
Disciplinary Policy rules as well as ACAS guidance on impartiality in the
disciplinary process. These rules are of course in place to prevent
victimisation. Since the rules were not followed, there was victimisation.
Unfortunately, while I considered the School’s actions to be unethical, I only
became aware of these rules several months later.
The investigating officer role
was eventually removed from the headteacher prior to the fact-finding meeting
and hearing. The hearing notes reveal that the School was well aware of a
conflict of interests. The presenting officer remarks that the headteacher ‘was
advised’ by HR ‘that in case of any possible conflict it would be best if she
did not continue with the investigation and instead she should arrange for
another suitable person/governor’ to undertake the investigation. However, the
presenting officer (also the investigating officer that replaced the
headteacher) acknowledges that the headteacher’s investigations were retained:
‘she passed me the documentary evidence she had gathered relating to the alleged
breach. This evidence is all detailed in the pack.’ The evidence should have
been dismissed or it should have been re-investigated. According to HR itself,
‘HR advised her [the headteacher] that it wouldn’t be right for her to continue
looking into’ my case. Due process was not followed, meaning that I did not
receive a fair hearing. [3g, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3e]
In the same meeting in which
I was informed about the fact-finding meeting, I notified the headteacher that
I had recently been elected as a National Education Union workplace
representative by [the school]’s NEU group (on 10th December). The
other rep was the member of staff who suffered the breakdown; hence, I was the
only acting union rep at this time. The headteacher did not question the
information that I had conveyed to her; hence she knew I was an elected union
representative prior to the disciplinary hearing.
January 2020
During my disciplinary
hearing, held on 17th January, the School argued for dismissal to be
kept on the table as a possible sanction. These comments, made by the
presenting officer on behalf of School management, are omitted from the
existing hearing notes. Yet, all those present, including HR, would have heard
them. In the context of the whole case, I contend that the threat of dismissal
was disproportionate and consistent with a pattern of victimisation that is now
clearly visible. As I will show, the School already knew at this time that
there was no possibility of the School being investigated or fined by the ICO;
hence, it knew there was never a chance that the School would be brought into
disrepute when it wished to keep open the possibility that I might have brought
the School into disrepute. [3g, 3b]
I acknowledged that I should
have found an alternative method of contacting the chair of governors
confidentially but there was no consensus with those present about what that
method would involve. My representative stated that I had admitted to
committing a breach of GDPR. I had not in fact used those words myself, but
rather, as stated, I had expressed regret for not using a more suitable method
of communication. Clearly, a workplace hearing is not a context in which to
determine whether a criminal offence has been committed, or to plead guilty to
a criminal offence. My representative and I accepted in good faith evidence
that the School’s DPO provided, allegedly on behalf of the ICO. In the hearing,
the DPO made the following claims:
Do I
think there was a breach? Yes I do. It’s a criminal offence as it’s a breach of
the Data Protection and GDPR Acts. The person concerned could face criminal
prosecution. Even the outcome of this meeting is something I have to report
back to the ICO. So the investigation against the school is closed, against the
individual, I don’t know? It’s still open. I suspect that they will look to see
what the school has done and whether the school measures are appropriate.
As we shall see, these
claims on behalf of the ICO were to be disproven by the ICO itself.
In my outcome of hearing latter,
dated 29th January 2020, I was handed a formal, one-year written
warning. The disciplinary panel upheld the first allegation against me: ‘you
committed a breach of the General Data Protection Regulation’ (again, this is a
criminal offence). Yet, in the same letter, the panel stated that ‘the school
had been cleared of breaching GDPR’. Taking these statements together, it was
clear that the School had concluded that I was personally liable for a criminal
offence. [The council’s] HR later confirmed this position via email. Crucially,
the chair of the disciplinary panel was clear in the outcome of hearing letter
that its conclusion, and hence its chosen sanction, was informed by the
evidence of the DPO. Hence, it is not acceptable that the sanction still stands,
even historically. [3g, 2b, 3b, 3c]
The suggestion that I had
committed a criminal offence, combined with the false threat of substantial
fines –also cited in the hearing– was a cause of undue stress to me and my
family at the outbreak of the Covid pandemic. I sought medical help for this
stress at the time. ACAS is clear that employers have a duty of care towards
the mental health of those facing disciplinary action. I believe that, in
exaggerating and even fabricating its case against me, the School also failed
in this duty of care; and that [the council’s] Schools HR failed to act on what
it could and should have foreseen as my victimisation. I reiterate my belief
that HR also acted unethically when failing to ensure that my initial concern
was investigated legitimately. [1b]
February 2020
The School had alleged that
the ICO was conducting an investigation into me such that I was liable for a
GDPR breach; and yet, I had received no correspondence from the ICO about this
investigation in the manner that due process would dictate where an allegation
of criminality is concerned. In order to make an informed decision about
whether to appeal the outcome, my representative and I asked HR (on 10th
February) to supply both the hearing notes and correspondence from the ICO,
showing the status of my alleged ICO investigation. This information was
promised only to be withheld from us. Ultimately, I did not appeal the decision
within the short time limit not least because this promised information
was withheld. No reason was offered as to why this information could not be
provided. We now know that the ICO had and has no record of any written
correspondence with the School and that there was no ICO investigation into me.
I am therefore concerned that [the] Council managers withheld the information
from me deliberately and that this action had the effect of removing my right
to appeal, as granted to me by both the [the council’s] Disciplinary Policy and
ACAS guidance. [The council’s] managers allowed the false impression to be
given that the the ICO had threatened my personal prosecution when it had done
no such thing. [2s, 2b, 3b, 3c, 3f]
April 2020
When the headteacher
allocated year groups to teachers for the academic year 2020-2021, I was
allocated a Key Stage 1 position (in a phone call of 23rd April).
This was surprising given that all of my seven-year teaching experience had
been in upper-KS2, where my expertise was based. While the headteacher was
entitled to do this in isolation, her decision was consistent with a pattern of
victimisation that is now apparent. It is reasonable to assume that she
allocated me a role to which I was less suited in order to persuade me to leave
the School. I confirmed in writing what the headteacher had said to me on the
phone, and added that I had no experience of teaching KS1. She was to repeat
this gesture the following year, only this time informing me in front of my
class that I would be teaching a Reception Class (Early Years Foundation
Stage). [3g]
In the same month, amidst
the first Covid lockdown, the headteacher directed teaching staff to come to
school to telephone children, despite guidance from [the council] and the
Government that workers should only come to the workplace if and when
absolutely necessary. My union and I pointed out that the technology existed to
contact families from home in a safe and inexpensive manner (other schools had
signed up to this or had found other solutions). She wrote to me in a
confrontational and unprofessional manner, confirming that she was directing me
to come to school, in breach of [the council] and Government guidance. She
called this guidance ‘just guidance’, which was not true since some Government
guidance is statutory; she may have acted unlawfully in asking staff to make
unnecessary risks at the height of the pandemic. The headteacher also said
that, in seeking to follow the rules about public health, I was not fulfilling
my role as a public sector worker.
This was consistent with the
ongoing victimisation. Since I was on a formal warning (the outcome of hearing
letter made it clear that any further infringement would result in dismissal) I
was left in the unenviable position of either risking my job and livelihood or
risking the health and safety of myself and others by breaking Covid rules.
Again, there was a cavalier attitude to health and safety at the top of the
School. [1c]
My union and, to its credit
on this occasion, HR, intervened to ensure that staff such as myself were not
required to physically come to school at this time for unnecessary reasons such
as phone calls. The headteacher was informed of this. I was given alternative
work that, however, went beyond what other staff were asked to do: when rounds
of phone calls were cancelled, my alternative work was not; hence I was treated
detrimentally. The headteacher did not communicate the new position to staff;
it was instead left to my local union to disseminate this information to its
members, leading to unhelpful and unsafe confusion. Aside from risking the
health and safety of all those inside and outside the school building, this
constituted an act of dishonesty and victimisation – there was no need to
insult me by questioning my commitment to public service. On the contrary, I
was seeking to fulfil a commitment to public service by supporting public
safety, the NHS, and compliance with the law. [1b, 1c, 3g, 3b]
May 2020
At this time, I applied for
various positions, directly to schools and via agencies. My live disciplinary
sanction was shared with schools including another [council] maintained school,
where I was asked about the sanction during an interview with senior leaders
and governors. Given that I did not raise the matter, this information came
from the reference supplied by my then headteacher. This impacted negatively on
my reputation. I note that I was not successful in my job application. One
agency informed me that I would have to take zero-hour contract work because no
school would employ me while I had a disciplinary sanction. [3g]
November-December 2020
At this time, I studied the [council]
Disciplinary Policy that applied to my case more closely. I also researched ICO
rules about the monitoring of staff and ACAS rules about the monitoring of
staff and the disciplinary process. I discovered at this time that the School
had flouted all of these rules in multiple respects. I itemise them below:
The [council]
Disciplinary Policy
1.
The allegations against me were not
consistent. Appendix 6 of the LDP reminds investigating officers: ‘Well drafted
allegations are vital to ensure that the employee is fully aware of the nature
of the charges.’ And yet, I was sent two different sets of allegations in two
different invitation letters, one day apart. The first letter, dated 7th
January, contained one allegation, whereas the second letter, dated 8th
January, contained three allegations. At the time, I was clearly under a great
deal of pressure and did not realise the significance of this discrepancy; this
was my first disciplinary experience. While I understand that the School was at
liberty to change the nature and number of its allegations, there should have
been but one set of allegations that took priority over any other, prior
versions. Crucially, the second letter failed to clarify whether it had
rescinded the first letter.
The
first letter came from the presenting officer and the second from Lewisham HR.
The LDP states that ‘an outline’ – singular – ‘of the allegations’ should be
sent by the ‘presenting officer or school’s HR adviser’ – not both (paragraph
6.1). I note that this issue was raised by my representative in her hearing statement.
However, the matter is not mentioned in the outcome letter and it is not clear
why this breach of the LDP was tolerated.
Moreover,
the first two allegations (in the second invitation letter) were not distinct
allegations. For, using an email address ‘for a purpose other than it was
specifically collected’ (allegation 2) would be the reason that a potential
breach of GDPR had occurred (allegation 1). Hence, allegation 2 is already
implicit in allegation 1. The allegations were unjustly duplicated and hence
not ‘well drafted’ as stipulated in Appendix 6.
2.
The School should have referred to ‘the
standard which the employee is alleged to have breached’ (Appendix 6). During
the hearing, my representative specifically asked the presenting officer which
aspect of the School’s code of conduct I was accused of having broken. He was
unable to name any specific item: ‘I can’t direct you to a particular point’.
If the implication of the allegations against me was that the standard I had
broken was GDPR itself, then I note that GDPR is the law and not a standard. It
was not established prior to the hearing that I had in fact broken the law. On
the contrary, the ICO is clear that the matter ‘may not have reached the
threshold for reporting’. A workplace disciplinary hearing cannot decide on
matters of law.
As
with point 1, my representative raised this issue during the hearing with no
response from [...].
3.
My case should have been discussed with a
union official from my local union prior to the hearing because I was, by the
time of the hearing invitation(s), a workplace representative at the School.
‘No disciplinary action should be taken against a trade union official until
the circumstances of the case have been discussed with [the council’s] Schools’
HR and raised with the district official of the union concerned.’ (3.9; 4.11).
This did not happen, suggesting both victimisation and union victimisation.
I
became a workplace representative on 10th December 2019, having been voted in
legitimately by fellow members. Minutes of the meeting were taken and retained.
It was attended by both the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of my local union
following concerns about the treatment of workplace representatives at [the]
primary school. I informed the headteacher of my role verbally only a few days
later. She acknowledged this verbally and hence she knew before my
invitation to the disciplinary hearing that I was a union rep. She subsequently
corresponded with me as a union rep to discuss Covid safety measures.
4.
The School included references to CCTV
footage of me in its hearing pack; footage that was requested by the
headteacher. The LDP asks that CCTV footage ‘should be shown to the employee to
allow them the opportunity to comment and respond’ (4.16). This did not happen.
5.
The School failed to redact my personal email
address. It shared this data with all present during the hearing when including
it in its evidence pack. ‘Where appropriate confidential or sensitive
information… may be redacted’ (6.1). Redacting my email address would have been
appropriate. [3g,
3a, 3c]
The
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS)
1.
School management used CCTV footage of me
during the investigation in breach of ACAS guidance (as stated, the hearing
pack shows the emails from the headteacher requesting and receiving this
information). Employees should be notified that CCTV may be used to monitor
them; ‘this is usually done by displaying signs to say where the locations of
the cameras are including displaying signage close to the camera being used.’ There was no such signage on display at the
time CCTV footage of me was used.
2.
ACAS advise that, where a ‘trade union
representative’ is concerned in a disciplinary case, ‘it is advisable to
discuss the matter at an early stage with an official employed by the union,
after obtaining the employee’s agreement’ (paragraph 30). This did not happen.
3.
ACAS advise that an employer has a duty of
care towards the mental health of employees facing disciplinary action. I
suffered unnecessary anxiety as a consequence of being told that I could face a
criminal prosecution and fine, and I sought medical help. I am concerned that
the School failed in its duty of care towards my health.
4.
ACAS advise that, ‘Where possible, the
employer should get somebody who's not involved in the case to carry out the
investigation, for example another manager or someone from HR.’ School
management correctly decided to transfer the investigating officer role from
the headteacher to a governor. The new investigating officer helpfully
clarified during the hearing that this change was due to the likelihood of a
conflict of interests, given the headteacher’s role in the letter. However, the
headteacher should not have participated in any part of the
investigation into me. Her investigations, including requesting CCTV footage,
were included in the hearing pack. Moreover, the DPO stated in the hearing that
the Headteacher had asked him to report my name to the ICO having already
attempted to report the School. The headteacher’s investigatory role was not
removed from the hearing process, resulting in a clear conflict of
interests that compromised the impartiality of my hearing.
[1b,
3g, 2a, 3a, 3c, 3e]
The
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)
1.
The ICO asks that employers ‘Give workers a
clear notification that video or audio monitoring is being carried out and
where and why it is being carried out.’ I had not received this notification at
the time that the CCTV data was processed by the School.
I
subsequently and by chance found the staff privacy notice on the School’s
website, which may have dealt with CCTV monitoring. However, following a
thorough search of my work email, the staff handbook and the code of conduct
(when still working for the School) I concluded that I had never been informed
about the existence of a privacy notice. Therefore, this notice did not apply;
the ICO requires that employers ‘must proactively make individuals aware of
this information and you need to give them an easy way to access it.’ It continues:
‘Simply putting it on your website, in case people happen to look there, is not
enough.’ I was not proactively given clear notice of the possible uses of CCTV
by the School, including for disciplinary investigations. As such, the School’s
use of CCTV footage of me as evidence was not consistent with the ICO guidance
and constitutes a suspected GDPR breach that has not been reported to my
knowledge, despite my subsequent alerting of the School to this suspected
breach.
2.
The School shared my personal email address
by displaying it, unredacted, in its hearing pack. The outcome letter confirms
that all members of the panel read the hearing packs. I also note that the
staff privacy notice did not apply, for the reason given above (1).
My
personal email address appears to have been photographed on a mobile phone or
camera. I have received no information from the School as to how this data has
subsequently been processed.
[3g, 2a, 3a, 3c]
December 2020
Due to the possibility of
further victimisation, I waited until my sanction was about to expire before
contacting the ICO, to find out what exactly had gone on. The ICO treated this
as a subject access request and replied in January 2021.
Its reply revealed that, not
only was there no ICO investigation, but the ICO was ‘unable to locate any
personal data connected to’ me in relation to the matter. ‘We also have no
record of having been in contact with your employer relating to the matter you
describe,’ it stated. The ICO continued, ‘If the matter does not progress to
formal case work we would have no record of it. […] The information provided by
the data controller may not have met the threshold for reporting to the ICO,
which would explain why we have no record of it.’
The DPO, on behalf of the
School, thus misrepresented the facts in an unethical and a potentially
unlawful manner (I refer to both misrepresentation and negligent misstatement).
[2b]
The DPO would have known
that the ICO had no case against me – nor the School – when he testified that
the ICO had an ‘open’ case and that I could ‘face criminal prosecution’. This
constituted a scurrilous misrepresentation of the facts that has had damaging
consequences for me. [3g, 3b, 3f]
The DPO claimed that the ICO
considered there to have been a ‘full breach’ and that there was an
‘investigation’. The ICO information disproves this claim. If it had been
reported as a full breach then there would have been a written record: ‘The
information provided by the data controller may not have met the threshold for
reporting to the ICO, which would explain why we have no record of it.’ The
absence of a written record means that there was no ‘full breach’.
Drawing upon the DPO’s
evidence, the disciplinary panel’s letter stated that the ICO ‘would want to
know what action the school had taken as a result of the investigation.’ We now
know there was no investigation; hence this information is false. The DPO knew
it was false: he would later admit, in February 2021, that the ICO had already
informed him at the time of the hearing, on the basis of a form that he
submitted, that it did not intend to take up the matter. The ICO’s
consideration of this form did not constitute an ‘investigation’ as the word is
normally understood by a reasonable person. [3b, 3c] I have never seen
this correspondence from the ICO, which the DPO and HR claim to have knowledge
of. This cannot refer to the acknowledgement of a report included in my hearing
pack.
The ICO has since confirmed
to me that it has never investigated me and that, ‘If any investigation were to
be undertaken you would be contacted.’ I was never contacted.
It is therefore my
reasonably held belief that the DPO wished to give the disciplinary panel the
impression that the ICO would pursue a prosecution against either the
School or myself were School management not to impose a convincing sanction
upon me. This is consistent with the ongoing pattern of victimisation. [3g,
3f] I am of course concerned that the DPO, employed by [the school], was
pressured into acting unethically by his employer. I note that both [the
school] and [the council’s] HR continue to support his evidence.
January 2021
The following incident,
which happened during the second lockdown, is relevant to my submission because
it demonstrates an established case of dishonesty on the part of the
headteacher, indicating that she was capable of unethical conduct. The
headteacher informed all staff in an email that she wished to introduce a new
code of conduct. She claimed that it had been approved by unions and [the
council’s] HR. As a union rep, I naturally sought to confirm this with my local
union, since I had not been consulted. It transpired that, not only had unions
not been consulted, but HR had not been consulted either (confirmed by HR).
Instead, it had been imported from a school based in Surrey. Hence, the
headteacher was dishonest to the entire staff when claiming that it had been
approved by unions and HR. She apologised to me by phone in my capacity as a
rep (on 20th January) and offered to apologise to staff, which I
said would be a good idea. She did apologise but not for dishonesty. To me, she
attempted to blame the member of staff to whom she apparently delegated this
task – this was of course beside the point; she clearly knew that the code of
conduct had not been approved by unions or HR when she said to all staff in
writing that it had been. This constitutes a proven case of widescale
dishonesty in the workplace and provides some context for the other cases of alleged
dishonesty that I have enumerated in this letter. Such dishonesty is of course
inconsistent with the Headteachers’ Standards.
February 2021
I received advice from my
union that I could and should request my sanction to be voided on the basis
that the School had misrepresented the facts during my hearing. I attempted to
reach an agreement with HR via my union to reach this end. Unfortunately, HR
would not ultimately agree. HR suggested that it was satisfied by the
above-mentioned explanation by the DPO. I understand that, in an email dating
from February, the DPO admitted that the ICO had confirmed to him in late
January 2020 that it did not wish to investigate the matter because the chair
of governors had not suffered any material loss. The hearing was on 17th
January and the outcome of hearing letter is dated 29th January,
leaving the DPO almost no time for this to have happened after my hearing; and
even if it did, this merely proves that the ICO had not even opened an
investigation. Indeed, this is academic because the ICO’s position is that
there was no ‘open’ investigation; that no breach was recorded as reported; and
that there was no requirement to report back to the ICO about my hearing. The DPO
would have known that a ‘criminal prosecution’ was impossible when he stated
that it was possible. [3g, 2b, 3a, 3b, 3f]
March 2021
On the advice of my union
and its legal team, following the new information from the ICO, I asked the
School to void my sanction by way of an appeal. I requested an exception to the
usual appeal period on the grounds that new and important information had come
to light: the SAR reply from the ICO. I also included the procedural concerns –
but not, at that time, the growing victimisation concerns. I was advised not to
submit a grievance against the DPO, headteacher or the chair of governors since
this might have aggravated the appeal request. Also, as I was attempting to
leave the school, further victimisation might have arisen had I raised
grievances at that time.
In the same month, the
headteacher informed me that I would be working in a Reception class (age 4-5)
if I remained at [the school]. I pointed out that I had no training or
experience in Early Years Foundation Stage, which does not form part of the
National Curriculum that I am trained to teach. Again, while this might be
acceptable in isolation, the context shows that this was an unethical attempt
to encourage me to leave the School. [3g]
May 2021
I secured a position in
another school, in another borough. However, this application and interview
process taught me that schools can and do ask about past disciplinary
sanctions, unspent and spent (the typical question being, ‘Have you ever
received a disciplinary sanction?’). For this reason, I am put at an unfair
disadvantage until the record is corrected and I will therefore continue to
argue for the lapsed sanction to be voided. That I am still impacted negatively
by it, given the catalogue of errors made by [the council’s] managers, is
unacceptable. [3g]
June 2021
After an unacceptably long
three months, my appeal request was finally declined in a brief email from the
chair of governors – with, it claimed, the support of HR – citing a time limit
and legal advice. Neither the School nor [the] Council engaged with any of the
concerns, which is unreasonable and suggestive of avoidance. In fact, the
school offered renewed support for the misrepresentations: the ICO was
contacted as represented, it claims, despite no evidence to support this and
convincing evidence to refute it.
The position of the School
and of [the] Council was and remains therefore that the ICO is incorrect about
the ICO’s own words and actions; this is manifestly a nonsensical position for
a school and local authority to take with respect to a national, statutory body
like the ICO. [3g, 2b, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3f]
July 2021
I replied to the chair of
governors pointing out that the School had not engaged with my concerns. I also
asked her to confirm whether the original mental health incident would ever be
investigated.
The chair of governors did
not reply to this email. Her silence confirmed my prior suspicions that I had
in fact been victimised by the chair of governors, the headteacher, the DPO and
managers in [the council’s] Schools HR. It confirmed that, while I was
considered worthy of being investigated and punished for a suspected data
breach (having misrepresented the role of the ICO), a health incident was
considered unworthy of investigation. This discrepancy is especially marked
given that no material loss was suffered by the potential victim of my
suspected breach whereas my colleague certainly suffered work-related ill
health. I put it to you that this discrepancy between the two incidents can be
explained by victimisation and collusion intended to avoid accountability. [3g,
3d, 3f]
In the same response to the
declined appeal, I also asked the chair of governors to confirm that she had
accepted the original letter of 2019 in good faith; as was said, in declining
my offer to have the letter signed, she gave the clear impression that she had
accepted the letter on behalf of myself and several staff. Her lack of response
in 2021 served to confirm that she had in fact never accepted the letter from
several staff, confirming the attitude of the School’s presenting officer
during my hearing (the letter was only ‘allegedly’ from several staff). She had
therefore acted disingenuously and dishonestly when giving the false impression
that she had accepted the complaint and would act on it. [1a, 3g, 3b, 3d]
I also asked the chair of
governors why she had clearly breached my confidence when passing on my name to
the person I blew the whistle on, when she had promised to keep my identity
confidential. There is a clear pattern of dishonesty that is unbefitting the
position of a chair of governors. [3b, 3d]
I later wrote to HR, in
July, asking it to confirm whether it supported [the school]’s decision to
decline my appeal request as [the school] had claimed. HR did not reply to me,
again forming part of a pattern of passive victimisation and, I am sad to say,
collusion within [the] Council. [3g, 3d, 3f]
October 2021
Following the silence from [the
school]’s chair of governors and [the] Schools HR, I escalated the matter by
writing to [the council]’s Director of Education (26.10.21). She did not reply.
[3d, 3f]
January 2022
I chased up the Director of
Education (13.1.22); again, there was no response. I remarked that, to the
extent that she would not confirm [the school]’s position, I was reassured that
I did not consider her to be actively party to my victimisation. However, I note
that she did not deny [the school]’s claims. [3g, 3f]
March 2022
An article was published in
the South London Press about the headteacher, based on information provided by
former parents and staff, as well as School management. While I was not
comfortable with some of the statements made by the reporter, I have no doubt
that the contributions of those claiming to have negative experiences of the
School’s management were genuine – I was acquainted with some of these
individuals, after all. The SLP article does not contain details of my own
case; it is nevertheless relevant to this whistleblowing concern in the context
of what happened in the following months.
April 2022
In April, I was made aware
of some media content that had been published on the Guardian Jobs website. The
piece purported to be an interview with the headteacher of [the school].
Ostensibly following a complaint, the truth emerged that the author was until
very recently herself a [...] governor and that this interest was not declared
in the piece. The Guardian Jobs editors thereby added this information to the
media content, as well as a notice to readers that the piece was in fact
commercial (paid for) content, hence promotional material and not journalism. I
also understand that, ostensibly following another complaint, the School
removed a claim made by [the school] on its own website that the content was
published in The Guardian, thus insinuating that the content was journalism
rather than commercial content. Were it to have been paid for by anyone
connected to the School or [the] Council, I assume that this could constitute a
misuse of public funds that would require investigation.
I was therefore disappointed
to learn that [the] Council’s Cabinet Member for Children’s Services and School
Performance had offered his support for the commercial content on Twitter,
adding that the headteacher was ‘inspirational’. I felt obliged to write to the
councillor in order to point out the above-mentioned context of the media
content, and to point out that several parents and staff had felt moved to
contribute to a press article expressing their negative experiences of the
School management; that he was thereby not representing the views of his local ward
(in which I believe [the school] is located) as a whole. I also said that I
would not expect him to support this use of public money. He replied to me by
reiterating his support for the School’s management; he offered no assurance
that he would remove his Tweet.
Independently of this,
following the lack of response from the Director for Education, I wrote to my
own local [...] councillor to raise my concerns. She put me in touch with the
above-mentioned Cabinet Member, who recalled my recent contact with him.
Surprisingly, he advised me that I did not need to declare my sanction in
future job applications. This struck me as a potential compromise solution, in
the sense that my record would be cleared (de facto) without managers facing
responsibility for errors made. However, I required confirmation that this was
the agreed position of [the] Council. I therefore asked him to confirm this
suggestion in writing, with HR and the Director for Education copied in, to
protect me from any accusation of dishonestly from potential employers. I reminded
him that schools do ask about spent sanctions.
The Cabinet Member replied
without mentioning my request; hence his suggestion was not agreed by the other
stakeholders in the Council. Moreover, the Cabinet Member now changed his
advice: if a [council] maintained school were to ask about my spent sanction, I
should report it to him, and he would investigate whether the school had
followed best practice, he now advised. In saying his, the Cabinet Member had
changed his advice. It was unethical for the Council Member to have offered the
initial advice to me in such a dangerously uninformed manner, given his
position of responsibility for schools. Following his earlier advice – not
declaring my spent sanction, even when asked about spent sanctions – would risk
undue, negative consequences for my employment position and reputation were I
deemed to have lied.
I stated that I could not
accept the Cabinet Member’s latter advice because I would be in the position of
potentially having to disclose my spent sanction in the first place, which
would damage my chances of success in the application as well suffer
unacceptable damage to my reputational standing. I reiterated that I found the
sanction unacceptable for the same reasons given in this letter. He did not
reply to this.
Under normal circumstances,
I would only fault the Cabinet Member for offering advice over-hastily, based
on being misinformed. However, I must consider two further points. Firstly, he
claimed to be unable to act on any of the significant concerns I raised about [the
school], and other [council] managers, while at the same time claiming that he
was empowered to intervene in internal school recruitment procedures. This does
not strike me as consistent, suggesting an alternative motive in choosing not
to act on my concerns. Secondly, he has maintained his support for the
questionable, national media content while knowing about my case, the SLP
article and the context of the commercial content. Due to these facts, I am
afraid to say that I am seriously concerned that the Cabinet Member has become
party to the closing of ranks within [the] Council so as to avoid
accountability. I note that the Council Members’ code of conduct requires
Members to uphold the values of integrity, objectivity and accountability. [3c,
3d, 3f]
The Cabinet Member did at
least mention the Council’s whistleblowing policy. I await with interest to see
how my whistleblowing submission is handled by the Council.
I note that the Council’s
whistleblowing policy states, ‘complaints about malpractice/wrongdoing against
Council members will be handled in accordance with the Council’s procedure for
handling complaints of breach of the Council’s Member Code of Conduct.’
However, I also note: 1) the policy does not preclude the possibility of
raising a whistleblowing concern about a Council member; 2) a Cabinet member of
the Council is accordingly a managerial role; and 3) the conduct about which I
have concerns involves other [...] Council managers.
___________
Victimisation
Concern
It is my reasonably held
belief that I was victimised for raising a legitimate health and safety concern
that criticised a [...] manager. This was unethical. The following facts form a
clear pattern of victimisation.
1.
The health and safety concern that I raised
confidentially in 2019 should have been dealt with as a protected disclosure
when it was not. The person to whom I submitted the concern broke her agreement
to keep my identity confidential; she shared the concern with the individual
about whom I had raised the concern. [...] HR tolerated and supported these
errors. The School had no appropriate whistleblowing policy.
2.
While the School did not investigate the health
and safety concern that I raised, it deigned to investigate and discipline me
for a suspected data breach, in spite of the fact that the former incident
caused the greater harm.
3.
The person at the centre of the original
concern, the headteacher, opened and conducted the initial investigation into
me when she could and should have delegated this role, in line with LDP and
ACAS rules. As part of those investigations, the headteacher requested personal
data about me in the form of CCTV footage, which broke rules, was disproportionate
and potentially unlawful.
4.
The headteacher pressured me into being
seconded in her previous school. This had nothing to do with the stated
intention of supporting a member of staff because no such secondment programme existed
at the School. This was undoubtedly an attempt to remove me from the school
building to somewhere I could be monitored by a colleague on the same governing
body as the headteacher. This membership was not properly declared.
5.
The School knew that I was a union workplace
representative at the time of my hearing. No meeting was convened with union
officials to discuss my case, as required by ACAS and the LDP. The headteacher
subsequently called into question whether I was a workplace rep, having already
dealt with me via email as a workplace rep.
6.
The School chose not to report suspected data
breaches that it committed during the disciplinary hearing, even though
I made the School aware of these suspected breaches in my notes to be added to
my personnel file and in my appeal request. Those who were responsible for
these suspected breaches were not subjected to any disciplinary action in the
manner that I was. I was treated detrimentally by comparison.
7.
The School made a range of significant procedural
errors when carrying out its disciplinary investigation and hearing, demonstrating
the hasty and incoherent nature of the process.
8.
The School misrepresented the facts in its
case against me and has offered no plausible defence for this unethical conduct.
The School and [...] Council upheld these misrepresentations against me with no
reasonable explanation.
9.
Key documents were withheld from me following
my disciplinary hearing without any good reason, thus compromising my right to
appeal the outcome.
10. My
reputation in other schools suffered as a result of the sanction handed down to
me. This impacted negatively and unfairly upon my career opportunities.
11. The School
and Council has repeatedly failed to engage with the above, completely reasonable
concerns by ‘stonewalling’ me.
12. I
was regularly subjected to other detrimental treatment by the headteacher,
including being asked to work in year groups I was less suited to and
questioning my commitment to public service simply for upholding statutory
guidance and seeking to maintain health and safety.
___________
In conclusion, please could
you confirm that you have received my whistleblowing concern and advise me on
the how you intend to handle it.
I look forward to hearing
from you.
Yours faithfully,
[...]
________________________
My colleague only received a response to this missive after much chasing and making a complaint to a regulator. The response was as non-commital as they come: it was an internal school matter, etc. Funny that: collusion oblige...
